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NOTES
EFFECT OF SOVIET RECOGNITION UPON RUSSIAN
CONFISCATORY DECREES*
THROUGI an international executive agreement negotiated hy the President
in 1933, the United States recognized the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
as the Government of Russia and at the same time accepted an assignment
of all claims owed to the Soviet Government by the United States or its,
nationals.' The action terminated an unprecedented sixteen-year period of
non-recognition, 2 during which time the Soviet authorities had decreed the
nationalization of all Russian industrial and commercial organizations and
had confiscated all insurance properties and cancelled the rights of creditors
and shareholders therein.3 Prior to 1933 American courts uniformly denied
extraterritorial effect to these Russian decrees, 4 either because they emanated
from an unrecognized government5 or because, being confiscatory in nature,
*United States v. Pink, 10 U. S. L. WEEK 4171 (U. S. 1942).
1. See ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOIIATIC RELATIONS WITIH TIHY UNION OV ovllrT
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (Dep't of State, Eastern European Series, No. 1, 1933) ; (1934)
28 A,-i J. INT. L. No. 1, Official Documents, at 10. The United States agreed to notify
the Soviet Government of all amounts realized under the assignment, the intent being
to distribute such funds eventually to American private claimants to settle claims
against the Russian government. See letter of R. Walton Moore, Counselor of the
Dep't of State, Brief for United States, app. E, United States v. Moscow Fire IsI,.
Co., 309 U. S. 624 (1940). To this end, Congress established a commission to determinc
the validity and extent of such American claims. 53 STAT. 1199 (1939). For a dis-
cussion of the negotiations leading up to Soviet recognition see Sack, Diplomatic Cla ins
Against the Soviets (1918-1938) (1938) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rnv. 507, (1939) 16 N. Y.
U. L. Q. REv. 253.
2. The Soviet government came into power on November 7, 1917, after the over-
throw of the Kerensky regime, which had replaced the Czarist government. Tie
attitude of the United States toward the Russian government during the period of
non-recognition is traced by Wilson, Recognition of Russia (1934) 28 Am. J. INT. L. 90,
3. Specimen decrees are set out in Nebolsine, The Recovery of the Foreign lIssets
of Nationalized Russian Corporations (1930) 39 YA.LE L. J. 1130.
4. While the holdings were uniform, the reasoning of the courts was not always
consistent. See Borchard, The Unrecognized Government il Anlmerican Courts (1932)
26 Amr. J. INT. L. 261, 268; Connick, The Effect of Soviet Decrees in Ainterican Courts
(1925) 34 YALE L. J. 499. The same result was reached in other countries, Russiau
Comm. & Ind. Bank v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse, [19251 A. C. 112. For a
collection of foreign cases see Nebolsine, loc. cit. supra note 3; Wohl, Nationalization of
Joint Stock Banking Corporations in Soviet Russia (1927) 75 U. or PA. L. REv. 385.
5. The earlier cases emphasized this view. James & Co. v. Rossia Ins. Co., 247
N. Y. 262, 160 N. E. 364 (1928); Bourne v. Bourne, 240 N. Y. 172, 148 N. E. 180
(1925); Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917 (1924); cf.
Russian Reins. Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703 (1925).
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they were repugnant to the "public policy" of the forum.0 But Soviet recog-
nition and the Litvinoff assignment created new questions concerning the
effect recognition might have upon the enforceability of these prior Soviet
decrees confiscating Russian property situated within this country.4
The influence of recognition upon procedural aspects of the assignee's
claim was tested in a series of actions by the United States under the assign-
ment,8 but the first full decision on the merits was delayed until the recent
case of United States v. Pizk.9 The First Russian Insurance Company
established a New York branch in 1907, and, pursuant to laws of New
York,10 made certain deposits with the Superintendent of Insurance. Though
this company was nationalized and its property confiscated by Soviet decrees
and enactments in 1918 and 1919,11 it continued to do business in New
York until 1925, at which time the Superintendent was directed by the
Supreme Court of New York to take possession of the New York assets
of the company preparatory to liquidation.12 Thereafter all claims of domestic
creditors were paid off, a balance of over $1,000,000 remaining in the hands
of the Superintendent. The New York Court of Appeals directed that such
funds be used to pay off foreign creditors who had already filed their claims,
and that any surplus be turned over to a quorum of the board of directors of
the company.13 Recognition of the Soviet Government had occurred mean-
6. Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank, 253
N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479 (1930); see Habicht, The Application of Soairt Lars and
the Exception of Public Order (1927) 21 Air. J. I-ra. L. 238.
7. The courts of New York continued to deny effect to, the prior Russian dccrees.
Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 181) X. E. 456 (19341 ;
Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 280 N. Y. 28.6, 2) N. E. (2d)
758 (1939), aff'd by cqually dhidcd ct. sub. nom. United States v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co.,
•309 U. S. 624 (1940). But cf. United States v. Manhattan Co., 276 N. Y. 396, 12 N.E.
(2d) 518 (1938).
8. In United States v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Ct.,., 296 U. S. 463 (1936), the
Supreme Court refused to take jurisdiction away from the New York courts merely
as a result of the Litvinoff Assignment. Tile holding in United States v. Belmnt,
301 U. S. 324 (1937), was limited to the determination that the United States as cim-
fiscatory creditor had a cause of action against the stakeholder of Russian funds, no
adverse claimant being a party to that suit. But the dicta in that case formed the
basis of the decision in the Pink case. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S.
126 (1938), adjudged that the United States held its assigned claims subject to the
infirmity of the running of the statute of limitations against the claim. The Supreme
Court had a chance to fully review the merits of the claim of the United States under
the Litvinoff Assignment in United States v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co., 309 U. S. 624
(1940), but, being equally divided on the issues, it affirmed the lower court without
opinion.
9. 10 U. S. L. WN.zs 4171 (U. S. 1942).
10. N. Y. INs. LAW (Cahill's Consol. Laws, 1930) § 28.
11. The decrees are set out in the opinion of the court. United States v. Pint,
10 U. S. L. NVEr- 4171, 4173 n. (U. S. 1942).
12. Cf. N. Y. Ixs. LAw (Cahill's Consol. Laws, 1930) § 63.
13. Matter of People (First Russian Ins. Co.), 255 N. Y. 415, 175 N. E. 114 (1931);
N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 977(b).
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while, and before any substantial disposition had been made of this balance
of the assets of the company, the United States brought suit against the
Superintendent and the foreign creditors in the Supreme Court of New York
claiming an immediate right to possession of the entire surplus as confisca-
tory creditor under the Litvinoff Assignment. A motion to dismiss the com-
plaint was granted by the Supreme Court of New York and affirmed per
curiai by the New York Court of Appeals, 14 both relying on the latter's
decision in Moscow Fire Ins. Company v. Bank of New York & Triist
Company,15 in which the claim of the United States was disallowed under
parallel circumstances. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
It held that the right to the funds became vested in the Soviet Government
as successor to the First Russian Insurance Company; that this right passed
to the United States by the Litvinoff Assignment; and that the United States
was entitled to the property as against the company and the foreign credi-
tors. In reaching its decision, the Court argued that the Soviet nationaliza-
tion decrees were intended to embrace property in the United States and that
recognition validates all acts of the recognized government from the com-
mencement of its existence; and it also held the public policy of New York
denying effect to confiscatory decrees is over-ridden by the international com-
pact involved.'0 The Court finally concluded that foreign creditors acquired
no rights under the Fifth Amendment or the law of New York regulating
this distribution which could inhibit the power of the Executive to formulate
foreign policy and to secure for the United States and its nationals priority
over such creditors.
The finding that the Soviet confiscatory decrees were intended to apply to
Russian property without as well as within Russia is incontrovertible. 17 The
original confiscatory Insurance Decrees of 1918 and 1919 carried no linita-
tions on their face, and the official declaration of the Commissariat of Foreign
Affairs substantiates the view that the decrees were to have universal appli-
cation.' 8 The more significant problem is whether American courts should
be compelled to recognize the- validity of these confiscatory decrees when
14. United States v. Pink, 284 N. Y. 555, 32 N. E. (2d) 552 (1940).
15. 280 N. Y. 286, 20 N. E. (2d) 758 (1939), aff'd by an equally divided el. sOl',
nom. United States v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co., 309 U. S. 624 (1930), 49 YALE L. J. 324,
16. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 327 (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 292,
51 HA v. L. REv. 162. For further discussion of this prior decision see Borchard, Cor.
fiscations: Extraterritorial and Domestic (1937) 31 Am. J. INT. L. 675; Jessup, The
Litvinoff Assignment and thc Belmont Case (1937) 31 Am. J. INT. L. 481.
17. The Court apparently felt that such a finding was necessary because the New
York Court of Appeals had determined that the Soviet decrees were not intended to
operate extraterritorially. Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co.,
280 N. Y. 286, 306, 20 N. E. (2d) 758, 765 (1939), 49 YALE L. J. 324. The New York
court in so holding was attempting to circumvent the caveat in United States v. Belmont,
301 U. S. 324 (1937), that mere repugnance of the Soviet decrees to the public policy
of the forum was no grounds for denying them effect after recognition.
18. The declaration and the decree are embodied in the opinion. United States
v. Pink, 10 U. S. L. WEEK 4171, 4173 (U. S. 1942).
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applied to property with a domestic "situs". 10 Ordinarily, courts in adjudi-
cating property rights within their jurisdiction are governed by tile law of
the forum, and foreign law is given effect only as a matter of international
comity.2 0 Thus, before the Pink case the courts of no country would give
a confiscating government any title to property having a "situs" in the forum,
even after recognition, on tle grounds of the repugnancy of confiscatory
legislation to the "public policy" of the forum-' or by a finding that the
decrees were not intended to have extraterritorial effect. By eliminating
these factors from consideration, and by making recognition alone the su-
preme test of the validity of foreign confiscatory decrees, the Pik case has
given an unique and creative character to political recognition.
Application of such a doctrine may well extend the scope of an inter-
national executive agreement beyond the intent of its negotiators.23 Implicit
in the reasoning of the Belnont case2 4 was the premise that the President,
by executive agreement, may negotiate the recognition of a foreign sovereign
19. Owners of property situated within Russia at the time of confiscation would
not be allowed a recovery against those gaining title under the confiscatory decrees
on the ground that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
a government of another done within its own territory." Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U. S. 250 (1897). Nor can the original owners recover where the seized property
is subsequently brought into the forum. Oetien v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297
(1918).
20. For a general discussion of the application of foreign law and its restriction
when contrary to public policy see Lorenzen, Territorialiky. Public Policy and the Con-
flict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 736; Comment (1936) 45 YAtX L J. 1463, 1467.
21. James & Co. v. Second Russ. Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 243, 146 N. E. 369 (1925)
(before recognition); Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National
City Bank, 253 N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479 (1930) (before recognition); Vladilhvkazshy
Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456 (1934) (after recognition).
But see United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937). The foreign cases are reviewed
by Nebolsine, The Recovery of the Foreign Assets of Nationaliced Russian Corporations
(1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1130, 1153 et seq.
22. Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 20 N. Y. 286, 20 N. E.
(2d) 758 (1939), aff'd by an equalky divided ct. sub. nonm. United States v. Moscow
Fire Ins. Co., 309 U. S. 624 (1940). The English courts tend to accept this view. Cf.
Lecouturier v. Rey, [1910] A. C. 262. See also cases cited in note 29 infra.
23. It has been urged that recognition should have no legal significance. Borchard,
The Unrecognized Government in American Courts (1932) 26 Am. J. INr. L. 261;
Moore, Tme New Isolation (1933) 27 A.m. J. INT. L. 607; Williams, Some Thoughts
on the Doctrine of Recognition in International Law (1934) 47 HIAv. L. RE:v. 776.
But lack of recognition will deny a foreign government the capacity to sue in our
courts [Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923)] even though
the statute of limitations is ruming against its claim during that period. Soviet Republics
v. National City Bank, 41 F. Supp. 353 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); Guaranty Trust Co. v.
United States, 304 U. S. 126 (1938). In Lehigh Valley R. R. v. State of Russia, 21
F. (2d) 396 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 571 (1927), the recognized
Kerensky Government was allowed to maintain suit in our courts in the name of the
Russian State, although the Soviet Government had swept it from power almost ten
years previously.
24. United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 330 (1937), 47 Y.&LE L. J. 292.
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without the advice and consent of the Senate, and that- such an international
compact, like a treaty, becomes the "supreme law of the land".2 5 A valid
international agreement necessarily overrides a conflicting state law or
policy.26 But the treaty power is generally restrained so as not to derogate
from state sovereignty unless clearly necessary to effectuate the national
policy.27 Similarly, the scope of an executive agreement should be deter-
mined by a fair construction of its terms. Otherwise, "courts rather than
the executive may shape and define foreign policy, which the executive has
not adopted."' 28 Nothing in the compact according recognition to the Soviet
government or in the accompanying negotiations indicates that applicable
doctrines of state law were to be supplanted. The fact that the agreements
were part of a broad program to improve relations between the two nations
should not in itself be held sufficient to authorize the subordination of
domestic law to Russian law. Refusal of domestic courts to follow foreign
confiscatory transfers of title involving property within the forum has not
been considered inconsistent with amicable relations, or even with an active
military alliance. 29
The power of the executive agreement was further expanded by the Court's
refusal to establish the Fifth Amendment as a limitation upon the force and
effect of the Litvinoff Assignment. 0 Counsel urged that foreign creditors
had vested rights in the New York assets because the New York Court
had ordered distribution to them, and that to deprive them of this right by
an executive agreement would violate the Fifth Amendment. 1 The Court,
25. U. S. CoNsr., Art. VI, cl. 2.
26. See MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS (1941) 272-91; CIRAN-
DALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT (Ist ed. 1904) 106-15.
27. Treaties have always been strictly construed when necessary to avoid over-
riding state law. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 143 (1938) ;
Todak v. Union State Bank, 281 U. S. 449, 454 (1930) ; Disconto Gesellsehaft v. Utn-
breit, 208 U. S. 570 (1908). The Supreme Court has shown an inclination to grant
the President greater power than requested. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp,
Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936) ; LaAbra Silver Mining Co. v. Frelinghuysen, 110 U. S. 63
(1884). See MCCLURE, op. cit. supra note 26, at 323.
28. Chief Justice Stone, dissenting in United States v. Pink, 10 U. S. L. WVEEK
4171, 4181 (U. S. 1942).
29. Ibid. In spite of British recognition of Russia the English courts still refuse to
give effect to the Soviet decrees with regard to property located in England. Sedgwick
Collins & Co. v. Rossia Ins. Co., [1926] K. B. 1, aff'd, [1927] A. C. 95; The Jupiter
(No. 3), [1927] P. 122, aff'd, [1927] P. 250 (C. A.) ; In rc Russian Bank for Foreign
Trade, [1933] 1 Ch. 745. See also the El Condado (1939) 63 LI. L. R. 330,
30. For a full discussion of the Fifth Amendment and its control over the Litvinoff
Assignment see COWLES, TREATIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PROPERTY INTI"RlFURcI'i
AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1941) 275 ct scq. The Tenth Amendment does not restrict
the treaty power. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920).
31. The refusal of the New York Court of Appeals to allow the United States to
acquire the surplus funds without giving foreign creditors just compensation was an
undercurrent of their decision in Mloscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co.,
280 N. Y. 286, 311, 20 N. E. (2d) 758, 768 (1939). For a discussion of the briefs
submitted on the Constitutional question and an analysis of the Court's reaction in that
case see COWLES, op. cit. supra note 30, at 282-88.
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however, reasoned that as the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit states
from giving priority to local creditors as against nationals of foreign coun-
tries whose claims arise abroad, 2 so the Fifth Amendment does not preclude
the Federal Government from providing priority for itself and its nationals
against such creditors.m1 The Court's analogy would seem pertinent only if
the United States were a creditor in its own right. But this is not the case.
The United States is merely assignee of the Russian Government and hence
sues with the rights of a foreign creditor. The logical result of the Court'
position is that an international executive agreement according recognition
may grant priority to anyone over anyone, ignoring "due process" limita-
tions on the exercise of the power.34 By the same token even domestic credi-
tors could be deprived of their rights by the international compact for they
also may have lost protection of the Fifth Amendmhent.35 These objections
might have been avoided by a more limited argument. Under Russian law
the foreign creditors had no semblance of a vested property right in the
funds,36 and the Court might have argued that they could acquire no vested
interest in the assets by the "erroneous" decree of the New York court which
had not even proceeded to execution at the time the United States insisted
on its claim under the assignment.3 7 By holding that recognition forced the
32. Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 203 U. S. 570 (1903). This premise is open
to question. Cf. Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211 (1934), with Blake v. McClung, 172
U. S. 239 (1898).
33. "If the President had the power to determine the policy which was to govern
the question of recognition, then the Fifth Amendment does not stand in the waLy
of giving full force and effect to the Litvinoff Assignment." United States Y. Pink,
10 U. S. L. WV= 4171, 4175 (U. S. 1942).
34. Yet a formal treaty has only the force of a Congressional .tL Atakura v.
Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 341 (1924). Rainey v. United States, 232 U. S. 310, 316 (1914) ;
United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U. S. 213, 220 (1902). Ipso facto it must be subject
to Constitutional limitations. Cherokee Tobacco Co. v. United States, 11 AWall. 616,
620 (U. S. 1870); In re Beale, 2 Fed. Supp. 899, 901 (D. Minn. 1933), aff'd, 71 F.
(2d) 737 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934); see TucmER. LimIxtTioNs ON Trlc TnA'r-.MAxct.-,-
PowER (1915) 420.
35. The court refused to resolve this problem. See United States v. Pint:. l0
U. S. L. WEEK 4171, 4175 (U. S. 1942). But the tenor of the majorit3 and concurring
opinions would seem to allow even domestic creditors to be deprived of their stake in
the Russian funds. The assignment itself did not exempt domestic credituirs from its
operation and the availability of a Fifth Amendment objection is now open to question.
36. The First Russian Insurance Company was organized pursuant to the laws
of Russia and was subject to Soviet authority. The foreign creditors were not citizens
of the United States and the debts arose out of Russian contracts. The Soviet decrees
terminated the existence of the corporation, transferred title in the assets to the Russian
government and cancelled all the debts of the corporation. United States v. Pintr,
10 U. S. L. WEEK 4171, 4173 n. (U. S. 1942). Cf. Canada Southern Ry. v. Gebhard,
109 U. S. 527, 538 (18,3).
37. Distribution of the surplus which remained after the payment of claims of
domestic creditors would ordinarily be transmitted to the corporation at its domicile.
Matter of People (Norske Lloyd Ins. Co.), 242 N. Y. 148, 151 N. E. 159 (1926).
But this was impossible for the corporation had been nationalized at its domicile and
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state courts to apply Russian law, the foreign creditors could have been
foreclosed without interpretation of the significance of the Fifth Amend-
ment.
The courts of no other country will give extraterritorial effect to the Soviet
confiscatory decrees. Thus a desirable uniformity of international law is
thrown out of line by the decision in the Pink case, and a stakeholder of
Russian funds is subjected to the possibility of double liability. A custodian
of confiscated funds would be forced to turn them over upon the suit of the
original owner in England38 or elsewhere,39 while the Soviet Government,
or its assignee, after the principal case, might seek out the stakeholder in this
country and force a second payment of the same deposit on the ground that
the Russian Government and not its prior owner is entitled thereto. More-
over, the decision opens up such moot points as the status of the claims of
"foreign" creditors who are citizens of states other than New York,40 the
integrity of the previous distribution to "domestic" creditors,41 the avail-
ability of a "public policy" barrier to repugnant laws of other recognized
governments 42 and the disposition that will be made of the New York assets
of other foreign insurance companies recently taken over by the Superin-
tendent of Insurance in New York.43 The Pink case should be limited to
its facts, and should foreclose only Russian owners and Russian creditors
from recovering assets within the United States to which the United States
itself lays claim as assignee of the confiscating Russian Government. The
the Soviet government was not yet recognized. James & Co. v. Rossia Ins. Co., 247
N. Y. 262, 160 N. E. 364 (1928). Therefore distribution to foreign creditors and the
directors of the company had been ordered by the New York Court of Appeals. Matter
of People (First Russian Ins. Co.), 255 N. Y. 415, 175 N. E. 114 (1931). No sub-
stantial disposition thereunder had been made, however, for the United States was
granted a stay pending settlement of its claim.
38. See note 29 supra.
39. See cases collected by Nebolsine, The Recovery of the Foreign Assets of
Nationalized Russian Corporations (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1130, 1133 et seq.
40. Possibly creditors of Russian insurance companies residing in any "foreign"
state are foreclosed by the decision in the Pink case, for under New York law "domestic"
creditors necessarily includes only residents of New York. However, the Court sug-
gested a caveat in this respect. See United States v. Pink, 10 U. S. L. WEEtz 4171,
4175 (U. S. 1942).
41. See note 35 supra.
42. The decision in the Pink case will probably have little impact on settled conflict
of laws doctrines. For example, the law and policy of the forum generally govern the
effect to be given marriage contracts [RESTATMENT, CONFLICTr oF LAws (1934) § 134]
and divorce. Id. at § 135. As to chattels see id. at § 50. General applicability of the
principal case is apparently limited by the unique aspects of Russian recognition.
43. As a result of the Pink case, the United States has" moved to enjoin further
distribution of the surplus assets of the First Russian Insurance Company pending
further proceedings. It is also expected that the United States will seek custody of
the New York assets of insurance companies of other countries recently possessed
by the New York State Insurance Department, to hold pending peace negotiations
following the war, because of the possibility that another "Litvinoff Assignment" may
result. See New York Times, Feb. 5, 1942, p. 31, col. 8. The Pink case was recently
followed in Grant v. Steingut, N. Y. L. J., March 17, 1942, p. 1151, col. 1.
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effect given recognition may be considered unique because of the simultaneous
Litvinoff Assignment, and the interpretation of the Fifth Amendment may
be treated as unnecessary to the decision.
With the present invasion of recognized countries by the German Reich
and the establishment of a government headed by a German Commissioner
in the occupied countries, actions are appearing more and more frequently
in the New York courts questioning the effect to be given confiscatory
decrees now emanating from such an unrecognized German regime.4 ' The
Pink case has little bearing on these determinations, where the decrees are
those of a government unrecognized at present, and with slight possibility
of future recognition. Courts have thus far denied extraterritorial effect to
the decrees of the Commissioner of the Reich. The significance of the
Pink case will be found chiefly in the argument of the stakeholder that double
liability might follow the subsequent recognition of German occupationary
forces through any peace treaty negotiated by the United States. It is prob-
able, however, that this is a groundless fear, since rights once adjudicated
will normally be unaffected by subsequent recognition. 0
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF PROFITS ON GOVERNMENT
WARTIME CONTRACTS*
TRADITIONALLY the Government has relied upon the contract formula to
draw private industry into its wartime procurement program. 1 As an integral
part of the nation's mobilization for total warfare, these agreements are
affected by circumstances vastly different from those which condition similar
peacetime transactions. Normal price controls imposed by competitive mar-
kets vanish 2 in the face of the volume of supplies required and the limited
44. See Comment (1941) 41 CoL. L. RLv. 1072. The effect of Presidential "freez-
ing orders" must also be taken into account at present. A full treatment of the subject
of foreign funds control is contained in Comment (1941) 41 Cor. L REv. 1039.
45. Cf. Koninklijke Lederfabriek 0. v. Chase Nat. Bank, 177 Misc. 186, 30 N. Y. S.
(2d) 518 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Feuchtwanger v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
27 N.Y.S. (2d) 518 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Anninger v. Hohenberg, 172 Misc. 1046, IS
N.Y. S. (2d) 499 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Loeb v. Bank of Manhattan, 18 N.Y. S. (2d) 497
(Sup. Ct. 1939). But cf. Ballack v. Societe Generale, 177 Misc. 136, 30 N.Y. S. (2d)
83 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
46. This proposition is strengthened by the statement of the Supreme Court itself
that "the recognition of the Soviet government left unaffected those legal consequences
of the previous recognition of the Provisional Government and its representatives, which
attached to action taken here prior to the later recognition." Guaranty Trust Co. v.
United States, 304 U. S. 126, 141 (193S). Thus rights adjudicated by our courts on
the basis of decrees of the recognized Netherlands government, functioning in Londun
at present, could not be attacked if Germany were subsequently recognized as the de jure
ruler of Netherlands territory.
:'United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 10 U. S. L. WEEK 4210 (U. S. 19421.
1. See Comment, Mobili.cation for Defense (1940) 50 Y=AX L J. 266.
2. See Sair. REP. No. 944, pt. 4, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) -9; Comment, Legal
and Economic Aspects of Wartime Price Control (1942) 51 YArx L. J. 819.
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number of firms equipped for specialized production. To expedite deliveries
and insure that all available resources are tapped, negotiation replaces bidding
as the technique for allocating war contracts.a A dearth of competent nego-
tiators, the speed with which all contracts must be concluded and the slicer
magnitude of sums expended place the Government at a signal disadvantage.
And any form of contract thus far devised to achieve optimum production
at a minimum expense has generally proved subject to abuse by profiteers.4
In this context, the Government recently sought to assuage the more
serious effects of these wartime agreements by a novel judicial remedy in
the case of United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation.5 The United States
attempted to employ a bill in equity to recover back alleged unconscionable
profits realized on certain World War I contracts. The agreements had been
entered into by the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Cor-
poration' and the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Limited, a subsidiary
of Bethlehem Steel Corporation. Lengthy negotiations were conducted during
which the Fleet Corporation made repeated efforts to conclude contracts of
the lump-sum type.7 But Bethlehem would accept only cost-plus-fixed-fee
agreements which also contained a "bonus-for-savings" clause. To accelerate
3. Some of the recent statutes providing for negotiation are Pub. L. No. 139,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 30, 1941); Pub. L. No. 29, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (April
5, 1941) ; 54 STAT. 676, 41 U. S. C. note prec. § 1 (1940). Donald Nelson, Chairman of
the War Production Board, recently abolished competitive bidding as a general practice
in the placing of military supply contracts. Unless specific authorization is given for
bidding, all contracts must be concluded by negotiation. See N. Y. Times, Mar. 4,
1942, p. 13, col. 2.
4. Contracts employed by the government are commonly classified accordling to
the basis used to determine compensation: lump-sum, cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost,
cost-plus-fixed-fee, and cost-plus-fixed-fee with bonus-for-savings. Lump-sum agree-
ments may be objectionable because the. contractor ordinarily insists onl setting his
price high enough to cover all contingencies. Although the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-
cost contracts were used in the last war it was found that they encouraged inflation if
costs to increase profits. Recently this type of contract has been prohibited by statute.
54 STAT. 712, 41 U.S.C. note prec. § 1 (1940). Similarly agreements containing a
bonus-for-savings clause have fallen into disfavor because they place a premium on
high estimated costs. Although they compute the fee on the basis of estimated rather
than actual costs, it is thought that cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts afford less opportunity
for' profiteering. Nevertheless, even these contracts permit a larger return if either
actual or estimated costs are skillfully padded.
5. 10 U. S. L. WhE 4200 (U. S. 1942).
6. Broad powers were conferred upon the President by the Emergency Shipping
Fund Act, 40 STAT. 182 (1917). But on July 11, 1917, the President delegated the
authority vested in him by that statute to the United States Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corporation. Thereafter the Fleet Corporation was charged with the chief
responsibility of conducting the shipbuilding program. See United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 10 U. S. L. WEzs 4200, 4206 (U. S. 1942).
7. Specific findings were made by the master that the Fleet Corporation en-
deavored to persuade Bethlehem to build the vessels under lump-sum contracts.
Bethlehem, however, would accept only a "half-savings" form of agreement. Record
oii Appeal, pp. 626, 627, 643, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 10 U. S. L. WEEK
4200 (U. S. 1942) (hereinafter cited as Record).
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production and to avoid the administrative responsibilities incident to com-
mandeering the plant s the Government finally acquiesced in this demand.
The contracts provided for fixed profits, over and above actual costs, equiv-
alent to about ten per cent of the estimated cost,9 plus a "bonus for savings"
constituting one half the difference between the estimated and the actual cust
of the vessels. At the time of concluding the agreements the government
negotiators complained that the Bethlehem figures appeared to be inordinately
high."' Actual construction costs seemed to confirm the Government's
charges," since there was a difference between estimated costs and those
which actually resulted of approximately $26,000,000. Under the terms of
the contracts, Bethlehem would have received in fixed fees plus bonus pay-
ments more than $24,000,000, representing a total profit of approximately
22 per cent on their actual cost.
After having paid more than $20,000,000 in fees and bonus payments,
however, the Fleet Corporation refused to pay Bethlehem an additional
$5,000,000 which constituted the remainder allegedly due on the bonus.
Instead, the United States filed a bill in equity in 1925 to compel Bethlehem
to disgorge all payments already received under the bonus plan which the
Government averred represented unconscionable profits.'- Bethlehem, in
response, commenced an action at law to recover the balance claimed t,,
be due under the contracts. Relying on a strict construction of the agree-
8. While the Government could in theory have taken pussession of the Bethlehem
plant, it was felt that Bethlehem's organization was necessary to assure the success of
the Fleet Corporation's shipbuilding program. Since the Government ckuld vit co mpl
performance by an "unwilling organization", the representatives of the Fleet Corpira-
tion entered into the contracts, although resenting the commercial attitude of Bethlehem
and condemning Bethlehem for demanding its "puund of flesh". Record, p. 539.
9. Estimates included an allowance for a 29 per cent increase in wage rates. It was
also assumed there would be a 30 per cent decrease in efficiency of labor, that freight
rates would increase 42 per cent and that a flat 10 per cent of the total cost should be
added to cover contingencies. Record, pp. 1855-57. Bethlehem frankly admitted that
it expected to earn enough from the bonus clause to pay war and excess profits taxe.,
leaving a 10 per cent profit margin on the estimated cost. Record, pp. 553-54.
10. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 23 F. Supp. t76, 671) ( F. D.
Pa. 1938), aff'd. 113 F. (2d) 301, 304 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940); Record, p. 531. It is
questionable whether the government negotiators had sufficient information tot adcquatel
appraise the estimates. Record, pp. 641, 644.
11. The total estimated cost had been fixed at $11 4750,0l1), while the actual ba-w
cost proved to be $92,900,520.91. Under the terni of the contracts the bnus fitr
savings would exceed $13,000,000. The Government paid the actual cot, a fix ed fee
of $11,962,400 and the bonus for savings to the amount of $ ,t.60- pr,,fts t,,taling
about $20,000,000. But it declined to pay an alleged balance amouulting to mtore than
the $5,000,000 due as the remainder of the bonus. See United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp.. 113 F. (2d) 301, 304 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940). In the Supreme Court there
did not seem to be complete agreement between Justices llack and Fraukfurter n
to the proper cost figures. See 10 U. S. L. NVEzi 4200, 4208 (U. S. 1942 ).
12. No attempt was made to contest Bethlehem's profits under the fixed fee pr.-
visions. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Crorp., 10 U. S. L. WmFK 42d0. 4205
(U. S. 1942).
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ments, the district court in 1938, after consolidating the cases, upheld a
master's report granting Bethlehem full recovery. 13 This decision was later
sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 14 and affirmed
by the Supreme Court in the instant case.10
The Supreme Court decided that the disputed bonus provisions were not
severable from other portions of the contracts, and that Bethlehem was not
required to establish increased efficiency as consideration for the bonus it
received. In so holding, the Court rejected Justice 'Douglas' contentions that
the contracts were divisible and that the contemplated bonus would con-
stitute an unenforceable gift of government money.10 This holding may be
supported on the ground that the bonus clause was admittedly included as
a portion of the original consideration to induce Bethlehem to accept the
agreements. And there would be obvious practical difficulties in the appli-
cation of the suggested theory.' 7
13. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 676 (E. D. Pa. 1938).
Bethlehem did lose, however, on an attempt to obtain interest for the period prior to
entry of judgment in the action at law. Although the master had granted 2 per cent
interest, both the district court and the circuit court refused to make such an allowance,
Id. at 681; 113 F. (2d) 301, 307 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940). This action of the lower courts
was apparently approved by the Supreme Court.
14. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 113 F. (2d) 301 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
15. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 10 U. S. L. WEEx 4200 (U. S. 1942).
Justices Black, Byrnes and Reed formed the majority. Justices Douglas and Murphy
wrote separate concurring opinions, and Justice Frankfurter a vigorous dissent. The Chief
Justice and Justice Jackson were disqualified because of their participation in the case
as Attorneys General. Justice Roberts, since he served as master for the district
court, was likewise disqualified. Compare this opinion with that of the Supreme Court
in United States v. Cooper Corp. [312 U. S. 600 (1941)] which held that the Unitcd
States could not sue for treble damages as a "person" under the Sherman Act. There
it was Justice Black who, in dissenting, stressed the need for a liberal interpretation
of the Sherman Act in order to protect the Government against collusive bidding that
forced it to pay unduly high prices for its purchases. Justice Frankfurter, on the other
hand, followed the narrower construction of the majority which seemed less concerned
with safeguarding the Government against price fixing by private contractors.
16. Bethlehem was said to be obligated by implication of law and by specific con-
tractual provisions to maintain a certain minimum of efficiency without any special
reward. An analogous provision was interpreted by the Court of Claims as requiring
additional performance to sustain it. See Burke & James, Inc. v. United States, 63
Ct. Cl. 36, 53, 55 (1927). Where the bonus-for-savings clause was inserted in a supple-
mental agreement, additional compensation has been allowed only if the contractor
demonstrated special efforts to decrease production costs. Kling Bros, & Co. v. United
States, 89 Ct. Cl. 329 (1939); Cohen, Endel & Co. v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 513
(1925) ; J. J. Preis & Co. v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 81 (1923). The instant contract,
in Article XXIII, specified that Bethlehem "in all its acts hereunder, shall use its best
efforts to protect and subserve the interest of the Owner". Record, p. 120. Even in
the absence of such a provision, the law would impose a similar obligation. See
United States v. George A. Fuller Co., 296 Fed. 178, 180 (D. Kan. 1923) ; United
States v. A. Bentley & Sons Co., 293 Fed. 229, 235 (S. D. Ohio 1923).
17. Attempts to define "efficiency" in this context or show the causal relation
between savings and "increased efficiency" would present typical problems. According
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Throughout the litigation the Government alleged that the contracts might
be set aside either on the basis of fraud or because duress coupled with
exorbitant profits rendered the agreements unconscionable. Although Beth-
lehem's action was characterized as "daylight robbery" neither the master
nor the courts could find the necessary elements for fraud.18 The Court
further concluded that nothing in the circumstances which prompted the
Government's acceptance of the contracts constituted duress. Much was
made of the fact that the Fleet Corporation was represented by negotiators
who were equally competent with those of Bethlehem and who "voluntarily"
agreed on the type of contract and the price to be paid for the vessels. The
mere fact that the Government possessed the power to commandeer plant
facilities was regarded as a conclusive negation of tile argument that cir-
cumstances surrounding the consummation of the agreements were equiv-
alent to duress on the part of the industry. The Court apparently chose to
ignore certain general precedents which suggested that unconscionalilitv may
be presumed where one contracting party takes an unfair advantage of the
necessity of the other.Y9 But while any question of the extent to which
acquiescence in the agreement was prompted by a disadvantageous position
is difficult to resolve, it seems clear that the Government's negotiators entered
into the agreements with extreme reluctance and only when it became clear
that any further delay might seriously impede the war effort. And the sug-
gestion that the commandeering power of the Government offered an actual
alternative to acceptance of Bethlehem's harsh bargain seems quite unreal-
to the master, there was "no evidence that the cost of construction . . .was reduced
as a result of the 'bonus for savings' provisions of the respective contracts". Record,
p. 678. The circuit court, however, said that "the record contains some evidence tending
to show that the savings resulted, in part at least, from increased efficiency". United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 113 F. (2d) 301, 307 (C. C..A. 3d. 1940).
18. See the district court opinion in the Bethlehem case: "This is a charge of
actual fraud perpetrated by deception. The Master has found against this charge of
actual fraud and under all the evidence lie could not have found otherwise. The
managers for the contractor adopted the famous Rob Roy distinction who admitted he
was a robber but proudly proclaimed that he was no thief. The contractor 1oldly and
openly fixed the figures in the estimated cost so high as to give them the promlise of
large bonus profits. The managers for the Fleet Corporation knew that tlie estimate
was high and why it was high and so protested it. The reply of the contractor's
managers was, . . . 'take it or leave it'. Whatever wrong there was in this may have
been the wrong in a daylight robbery but there was no element of deception in it."
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 676, 679 (E. D. Pa. 1938).
19. The courts, for example, have sometimes set aside salvage agreement, as
unconscionable where the salvor capitalized on the distress if another t-o exact an
agreement for compensation greatly in excess of its services. Magntolia Pet. Co. v.
National Oil Trans. Co., 281 Fed. 336 (S. D. Tex. 19221 ; The Dcn Carlo,, 47 Fed.
746 (N. D. Cal. 1891) ; The Young America, 20 Fed. 926 (D. N. J. 184) : Broks v.
Steamer Adirondack, 2 Fed. 387 (S. D. N. Y. 1880); cf. The Elfrida, 172 U. S. 1'.
196 (1898). And justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, finds striking analogies in oth'r
fields of law. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 10 U. S. L. WFFK 4243,
4210 (U. S. 1942). See generally Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ve. Sr. 1251, 155
(Ch. 1750) ; Vernon v. Bethell, 2 Eden 110, 113 (Ch. 1762).
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istic.20 The Government was ill-equipped to assume the administrative
responsibilities and reluctant to hazard the impact of an extensive program
of commandeering on industrial morale and public opinion.21 Power to
commandeer in such circumstances is an empty bargaining weapon, and that
fact appears to have been appreciated by the industrial contractors.
When confronted with the manifestly inequitable results of these agree-
ments, the Court pointed to profits received by other wartime contractors,
seeking to make Bethlehem's return seem less unconscionable. But con-
doning Bethlehem's action by demonstrating that other firms were also suc-
cessful in taking advantage of the Government's ext'remity to exact exorbi-
tant profits seems particularly incongruous. If excessive profits be accepted
as the norm for testing wartime contracts which are challenged, profiteering
will be perpetuated rather than eliminated. More specifically, Justice Black's
comparison of the percentage of profits made by Bethlehem with those re-
ported by other contractors, many of whom were not even shipbuilders,
seems unwarranted. 22 At least there was no indication that the factors enter-
ing into the respective profit determinations were sufficiently identical to
justify conclusions from those comparisons. In essence, the Bethlehem con-
tracts admittedly produced profits which aroused the moral indignation of
the court and yet were tolerated because no adequate remedy seemed avail-
able within the scope of customary contract law.
Implicit in the Bethlehem litigation is the broad question of whether the
economy may best be mobilized for war by use of the contract technique.
More directly, however, the case dramatizes the need for evolving a new
method for dealing with the problems which arise when these wartime
contracts are employed. Efforts to set a maximum profit under the usual
cost-plus contracts can be defeated through inflation of actual and estimated
costs. 23 By subletting to wholly owned subsidiaries, also compensated on
20. See the Report of the Master, Record, p. 539: "The Government aimed to win
the war. Bethlehem was deemed essential to doing so. A failure to induce Bethlehem
to undertake the shipbuilding program covered by these contracts, followed by the
taking possession by the Fleet Corporation of the Bethlehem plants, could not have
accomplished 'the desired results. It was Bethlehem's organization that was necessary
to insure success of the shipbuilding program of the Fleet Corporation and, as the
Government did not have power to compel performance by an unwilling organization,
if Bethlehem demanded its price on the basis of substantial commercial profits rather
than contribute such services on a patriotic basis, the Government was obliged to take
the contracts on such basis or not at all."
21. For a discussion of the problems incident to commandeering see Connent,
Executive Commandeering of Strike-Bound Plants (1941) 51 YA.F L. J. 282.
22. See 10 U. S. L. WEEK 4200, 4203, 4204 (U. S. 1942). Justice Frankfurter
seems to answer these contentions effectively: "It is idle to compare the profits made
by Bethlehem under these contracts with profits made by industrial concerns of various
types under different types of contracts. Such figures are statistical quicksand unless
we are told also in each case that the contractor was not required to make any capital
investment, that he was insured against normal business risks, and that lie was guar-
anteed a profit, regardless of any change in circumstances." Id. at 4211.
23. Recognition of this problem is evidenced by existing devices and procedures
for a governmental check on both the estimated and actual cost figures prepared by
the contractor. See Comment (1942) 55 HAav. L. REv. 427, 435; note 4 sispra.
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a cost-plus basis, and including their profits as part of costs on the master
contract, a concern may substantially increase its overall return.2 t Such
safeguards as excess profits taxes25 or Congressional20 investigating com-
mittees, which may publicize the more flagrant cases of profiteering, provide
some protection. But taxes generally recoup only a portion of the exorbitant
profits while Congressional publicity merely functions at sonic later date
as an inspiration for further attempts at legislative curbs' or as a possible
blacklist. Some effective post-contractual legal device is needed to recover
back inordinate profits already realized by wartime contractors and to warn
potential profiteers that no exorbitant returns will be countenanced.
Absence of previous litigation on wartime contracts indicates that courts
cannot rely strictly on precedents to solve the problem. Orthodox doctrines
such as fraud, duress or unconscionability have been induced from case law.
But since the ambit of their applicability has been defined in conventional
contract decisions, they can hardly be accepted as the definitive test of
these atypical agreements. Only the form in which they are cast identifies
these wartime procurement contracts with the classic bilateral bargain be-
tween two individuals. In many significant respects they are conditioned
by extra-contractual considerations. A vast number of contracts involving
staggering sums must be negotiated speedily in a seller's market.27 Crisis
conditions make effective bargaining by the Government a difficult task.
Moreover, third parties are inevitably, if indirectly, involved in these bar-
gains. Allocation of necessary materials to government contractors forces
other manufacturers to curtail operations. Industries which normally depend
upon the output of government contractors are deprived of their sources
of supply. Such extrinsic considerations militate strongly in favor of a policy
of discarding conventional contract principles, and treating these wartime
agreements as a sui generis problem.
Judicial control of exorbitant profits on government contracts might have
been achieved by reliance upon existing legal doctrines. The most workable
basis for such a rule would have been a more liberal application, or, if
necessary, an extension of the fraud and unconscionability theories to cover
these wartime agreements.2 8 Because wartime contractors generally incur
24. Such arrangements between parents and subsidiaries are illustrated by the
instant case: Bethlehem Steel Company, Bethlelem's parent, sold it at the maximum
prices established by the War Industries Board, 43,000 tons of steel used in these
ships. Apparently these profits were included as part of the actual costs of tle vessels.
See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 10 U. S. L. WEEx 4200, 4201 (U. S. 1942).
25. For current excess profit taxation see INT. REv. Com- §§ 710-52. Some authori-
ties advocate that this tax be increased as defense expenditures are stepped up. See
ANDERSON, TNEC REP., TAATiON, REcovERY, AND D zENsr, Monograph 20 (1940)
246-49.
26. A Senatorial investigating committee, headed by Senator Truman, recently
condemned waste, inefficiency and profiteering in the current defense program. See
N. Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1942, p. 1, col. 3. Startling profits made by certain defense
contractors were also revealed by the House Naval Affairs Committee. See N. Y.
Times, Jan. 21, 1942, p. 1, col. 3.
27. See generally Comment, Mobilization for Defense (1940) 50 Yu.n L J. 2oj,.
28. See note 19 supra.
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no risks and are entrusted with the production of materials essential to the
very preservation of the nation, they might have been held to have assumed
responsibilities analogous to those of a fiduciary. 20 Moreover, a recognized
public policy emphasizes that the Government should not be required to
pay more than a reasonable price for war materials. Excess profits taxes, 0
specific statutory ceilings on profits 3' from the sales of certain war supplies
and the attempted supervision of defense contracts by legislative con-
mittees -3 2 are indicative of this attitude. Criteria used for limiting com-
pensation to property owners in the event of commandeering 3 or condem-
nation 34 also corroborate the existence of such a policy.
The Court, however, chose to avoid the problem of profiteering by re-
routing it to Congress. But even if control of profits is more properly a
legislative task, in the absence of a frontal attack by Congress on the prob-
lem, the courts should not preclude themselves from taking the initiative
by abnegating their own power. Certainly judicial relief would not interfere
with the enactment of statutory remedies; in fact, judicial action would
doubtless be necessary to complement specific statutory norms in resolving
issues such as those raised by the Bethlehem litigati9n.
29. Justice Frankfurter felt that "those upon whom the nation is dependent for
its supplies in the defense of its life would hardly wish to be judged by lower standards"
than those by which a fiduciary's conduct is judged. See United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 10 U. S. L. WEEx 4200, 4212 (U. S. 1942); Comment (1941) 9 Gio.
WASHi. L. REv. 693, 698.
30. See note 25 supra.
31. Statutes have been enacted which provided for a profit limitation on the con-
struction or manufacture of naval vessels and aircraft. 48 STAT. 503 (1934), 34 U. S. C.
§ 496 (1940), as amended by 49 STAT. 1926 (1936), 34 U. S. C. § 496 (1940); 53 STAT.
555 (1939), 34 U. S. C. § 496 (1940) ; 54 STAT. 676, 41 U. S. C. note prec. § 1 (1940).
But these particular profit limitations were later suspended. 54 STAT. 1003, 34 U, S. C.
§ 496a (1940). Recently, however, new bills have been introduced which would amend
and re-enact the Vinson-Trammel law of 1934, providing that the holder of every con-
tract exceeding $10,000 turn back to the Navy all net profits in excess of 6 per cent of
the cost of performing the contract. A similar turnback would apply to War Department
contracts. See N. Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1942, p. 1, col. 1.
32. See note 26 supra.
33. See United States v. McFarland, 15 F. (2d) 823, 826 (C. C, A. 4th, 1920)
(just compensation). The Selective Service Act of 1940 provides that rentals for com-
mandeered plants shall be "just and fair". 54 STAT. 885, 50 U. S. C. § 309 (1940).
See Comment, Execulik Commandeering of Strike-bound Plants (1941) 51 YALE L. J.
282, 290.
34. United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645, 656-57 (1884) ; See
West v. Chesapeake & Pot. Tel. Co., 295 U. S. 662, 671 (1935) (regarding just com-
pensation as the value at the time of taking) ; Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246,
255 (1934) (fair market value at time of seizure) ; Howell v. State Highway Dep't,
167 S. C. 217, 223, 166 S. E. 129, 131 (1932) (fair market value in normal times).
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VACATION IN BANKRUPTCY OF STATUTORY WAGE EARNERS'
PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED IN PREVIOUS STATE
INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS *
RECOGNIZING that wage earners are more seriously affected than ordinary
creditors when their claims against insolvent estates are not fully satisfied,
Congress and state legislatures have conferred limited priorities upon wage
claims in the distribution of debtors' estates.' Section 64(a) (2) of the
National Bankruptcy Act accords wages "earned within three months before
the date of the commencement of the proceeding" a second priority to the
extent of six hundred dollars.2  Additional protection is afforded wage
earners by Section 67(b) which preserves against the trustee "statutory
liens in favor of employees . . . created by the laws of the United States
or any state."3
A hiatus in the protection afforded wage earners is illustrated by the
recent case of Strom v. Peikes.4 An assignment for the benefit of creditors
had been made by the employer three months before an involuntary peti-
tion in bankruptcy was filed against him. The employee-claimant in the
bankruptcy proceeding asserted against the trustee a right to preferential
treatment because of a state statute conferring priorities upon creditors
as to wages earned within three months before an assignment.5 The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, because the claimant's wages
had not been earned within three months prior to the date when the bank-
ruptcy petition was filed, the claim could not be classified as a wage priority
established by Section 64(a) (2).11 The court also decided that no wage
earner's lien within the meaning of Section 67(b) was impressed upon the
debtor's estate by state law. The wage earner was accordingly relegated
to the status of a general creditor.
Federal court decisions, before and after the 1938 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act, are in conflict as regards the effect of state wage priority
statutes in bankruptcy proceedings. 7 A contrary position to Strom v. Pcites
* Strom v. Peikes, 123 F. (2d) 1003 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
1. See In re Estey, 6 F. Supp. 570 (S. D. N. Y. 1934). It was unce intimated tiat
wages should receive first priority in bankruptcy even in the alsence of statutory au-
thority. See In re Erie Lumber Co., 150 Fed. 817 (S. D. 6~a. 190tI.
2. 52 STAT. 874 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §104(a)(2) (1940).
3. 52 STAT. 876 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 107(b) (1940).
4. 123 F. (2d) 1003 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
5. N. Y. DEBTOR & CREDITOR LAW § 22.
6. A small fraction of plaintiff's wage claim, which had been earned within three
months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, was, huwever, granted a priority
under this subsection.
7. In re Slomka, 122 Fed. 630 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903), is in accord %,ith the Strom
case. Previous to the 1938 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, debts granted priority
by the laws of the United States or of the states retained their priorities in bankruptcy.
44 ST-T. 667 (1926). The claimant in the Slomka case sought to preserve his state-
granted priority under that provision. But specific mention of three-munth wage priorities
in § 104(b) (5) was held to except wages from § 104(b) (7) because specific coverage
of a subject in a statute excludes it from the statute's general provisions. The inequitable
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was taken in Manly v. Hoods and other cases, 9 where wage claims were
preferred in bankruptcy. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit found in Manly v. Hood that a Mvaryland wage priority statute 0
created a "lien, in the broad sense","' upon the insolvent estate. As the
main ground for its decision, however, the court said that wages earned
within three months before commencement of the state insolvency proceed-
ing were within the priority section of the Bankruptcy Act since the term
"commencement of the proceeding" referred to the state insolvency pro-
ceeding rather than to the bankruptcy proceeding. Although Section 1(13)
of the Bankruptcy Act specifically defines that term as "the date when the
petition was filed",'12 the court asserted that the statutory option to disregard
the Act's definitions where "inconsistent with the context"' 8 permitted it to
overlook this definition.
The definition in Manly v. Hood of "commencement of the proceeding"
finds some support in policy, statutory interpretation and analogy, The
analogy is the granting, before 1938, of priority by bankruptcy courts to
administrative expenses of antecedent state insolvency proceedings 14 when
priority for administrative expenses of the federal proceedings alone was
mentioned in the Act.' 5 As to statutory interpretation, it may be argued
that Section 64, the priority section of the Act, indicates Congress' desire
to safeguard wage claims against bankruptcy to the extent of six hundred
dollars, with the three-month limitation added primarily to guard against
fraud. Where the wage earner is prevented from collecting wages by his
employer's insolvency, a condition very similar to bankruptcy, it would be
inconsistent with this purpose of the Act to deny him a priority in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. On policy grounds it would be undesirable to permit
destruction of wage priorities merely by interposition of a receivership of
three months' duration between the dates of economic insolvency and legal
bankruptcy. The result would be unjust if wage earners whose claims are
favored both by state and federal law could not collect their wages under
either law because the courts of both governments participated in the ad-
ministration of their debtors' estates.16
destruction of the claimant's preference might have been avoided in the SIonka cagqe
by the application of the eqtially valid maxim that provisions in a statute should be
construed so as to effectuate them all. The present priority section, however, retaing
only those priorities granted by the laws of the United States, 52 STAT. 874 (1938),
11 U. S. C. § 104(a)(5) (1940).
8. 37 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
9. Matter of Argles, 46 Am. B. R. (N.s.) 113 (S. D. Cal. 1940); In re Rodgers
& Garrett Timber Co., 22 F. (2d) 571 (D. Md. 1927).
10. MD. ANN. CODE (Flack, 1939) Art. 47, § 15.
11. Manly v. Hood, 37 F. (2d) 212, 214 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
12. 52 STAT. 841 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 1(13) (1940).
13. 52 STAT. 840 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 1 (1940).
14. Gardner v. Gleason, 259 Fed. 755 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919) ; In re Chase, 124 Fed,
753 (C. C. A. 1st, 1903).
15. 44 STAT. 667 (1926).
16. See Manly v. Hood, 37 F. (2d) 212, 215 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
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But more convincing arguments are found to support the view that "com-
mencement of the proceeding" refers to the date of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy. This is the definition specifically written into the Bankruptcy
Act itself.' 7 Moreover, the analogy to the priorities judicially granted to
the expenses of state insolvency administrations before 1938 is imperfect
because that action involved an exercise of comity by federal courts in
allowing state courts to guarantee compensation to their officers. A closer
analogy is the rent priorities which are granted in the same section as wage
priorities' s and which are computed strictly from the date of filing the
petition in bankruptcy.19 Furthermore, the underlying purpose of the pri-
ority section of the Bankruptcy Act is to establish an exclusive hierarchy
of payment out of the bankruptcy estate.20 An extension of the time for
computation of wage priorities would confuse the bankruptcy estate with
earlier estates, such as that in the hands of an assignee in the Strom case.
To give weight to wage priorities granted by state law would be to ignore
the 1938 amendments which eliminated such priorities when granted by
state statutes.2 ' The words of the Act should not be "extended by the
courts to cover cases not comprehended . . . merely because the Case in
hand may be thought equally meritorious with those that are given a special
status."
22
In reliance upon state court decisions, it was urged upon the court in
Strom v. Peikes that the wage claim should have been upheld not only
under the priority section of the Act, but also under that section which
preserves as against the bankruptcy trustee wage earners' liens created or
recognized by state or federal law.2 In rejecting this argument the court
correctly pointed out that state decisions2 4 construing the New York statute2
under consideration had disagreed as to whether a lien was actually created
by the statute. Moreover, all of the cases had been concerned solely with
the validity of assignments for creditors which did not in their terms grant
wage priorities, and the terminology used in the cases was applicable only
to that problem.2 6
17. 52 ST.. 841 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 1(13) (1940).
18. 52 STAT. 874 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 104(a)(5) (1040).
19. In re.Bergdoll Motor Co., 225 Fed. 87 (E. D. Pa. 1915).
20. See H. R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 15, 16; 3 CoLuEr, BAn:-
RUFTCY (Moore's ed. 1941) 2052.
21. 52 STAT. 874 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 104(a)(5) (1940).
22. In re Estey, 6 F. Supp. 570 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
23. 52 STAT. 876 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 107(b) (1940).
24. Richardson v. Herron, 39 Hun 537 (N. Y. 1886), aff'd sub nom. Richardson v.
Thurber, 104 N. Y. 606, 11 N. E. 133 (1887) ; Burley v. Hartson, 40 Hun 121 (N. Y.
1886), aff'd, 109 N. Y. 656, 16 N. E. 684 (1888); Johnston v. Kelly, 43 Hun 379 (N.
Y. 1887).
25. N. Y. DEBTOR & CREDIToR LAW § 22.
26. Because state courts have no federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, this argument
could be carried to the logical extreme that no state precedents would influence bank-
ruptcy courts.
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Even if the state statute or the state courts had used the term "lien" to
describe the priority granted by the statute,27 federal courts would not be
constitutionally required to treat the state statute as creating a lien.28 Nor
would the inconclusive decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the Wilcox case 29 compel the federal court to follow state decisions on
statutes classifying claims as liens. In the Wilcox case, a corporation had
been dissolved under a state statute which permitted it to prosecute and
defend litigation for a period of two years subsequent to its dissolution.
In a voluntary 77B proceeding, begun after the expiration of the two-year
period, the dissolution was held to prevent the corporation from maintain-
ing its 77B petition on the theory that the state statute was a corporate
regulation which did not conflict with the Bankruptcy Act and that to give
effect to the state statute would be more in harmony with the purposes of
the Bankruptcy Act than to disregard it.30 Under such reasoning, if federal
courts interpreting the Bankruptcy Act were to follow expressions of local
law which termed a priority a lien, they would do so solely as a means of
effectuating Congressional policy.3 '
When local law classifies a state statutory priority as a lien, it might be
argued that, as a matter of construction, bankruptcy courts should adopt
the same definition. First, the Bankruptcy Act is expressly subjected to state
law in this matter since it preserves employees' "liens . . . created or
recognized by the laws of . . . any state." 32 Furthermore, the omission
to define the term lien3 3 in the Act is an indication that the 1938 amend-
ments were intended to effectuate in the lien section the desires of states
27. Previous to 1938 many estates had been totally consumed by state priorities to
the exclusion of general creditors; therefore state priorities were eliminated from bank-
ruptcy proceedings by the 1938 amendments. See 3 COLLIM, BANKRUPrCY (Moore's ed.
1941) 2025. To reintroduce them as liens would recreate the condition the 1938 antend-
ments sought to remedy.
28. An exception to the general rule that federal courts must follow local sub-
stantive law arises when the question is governed by the Federal Constitution or federal
laws. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
29. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302
U. S. 120 (1937) ; cf. Hopkins Savings Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U. S. 315, 337 (1935).
30. Cardozo, Stone, and Black, JJ., dissenting from the Vilcox decision, found a
conflict between the state law and the Bankruptcy Act. Therefore they felt the state
law should have been disregarded. See In re Harris' Estate, 99 Utah 464, 105 P. (2d)
461 (1940), cert. dismissed, 313 U. S. 541 (1941), 8 U. oF Ciii. L. REv. 532.
31. See Kernochan v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 860 (Ct. Cl. 1939), ccrt. denied, 309
U. S. 675 (1940). Compare In re Prudence Co., 79 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) with
In, re Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co., 75 F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). See also
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 107 F. (2d) 311 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939) ; Per-
kins v. United States ex rel. Malesevic, 99 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938) (especially
dissent).
32. 52 STAT. 876 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 107(b) (1940).
33. It may be contended that the use of the terminology in § 107(c) "where not
enforced by sale" to refer to liens preserved by the Act does not restrict the approvl
of the Act to liens which can be enforced by sale. It merely recognizes that in some cases
liens can be so enforced.
to protect wage earners, just as the previous Act did in the priority section.31
And the principle is well established that local law controls the isitue of
whether a lien on property has been perfected or not.35 Moreover, under
the policy enunciated in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,36 that there should not
be two rules of decision on the same substantive question in a single state,
federal courts should conform their definitions in bankruptcy proceedings
to those applied in state courts. Finally, when equities as clear as those in
favor of wage earners' claims against insolvent estates exist, courts should
be disposed to construe the Bankruptcy Act to pay them as fully as possible.
Yet this argument proves too much and must yield to the stronger view
that bankruptcy courts should determine as a construction of the Bankruptcy
Act and independently of state law whether wage claims are liens, and if
they are not, vacate them. The bankruptcy court is subject to the operation
of state law in that it may not vacate a lien created or recognized by state
law, provided it is a lien within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. But the
court is independent of state lawv in determining whether or not what the
local law recognizes is really a lien.3 7 Liens, in the strict sense, differ from
priorities. A priority is a right to receive payment from an insolvent estate
before other claimants do; it embodies no power of levy or attachment. A
lien consists of a right to enforce claims against specific property in fulfill-
ment of a contractual or statutory right, entirely apart from any insolvency
proceedings. 38 From the terminology "where not enforced by sale",30 it
should be inferred that the Bankruptcy Act employs the term lien in a sense
which excludes mere priorities. Furthermore, the legislative history of the
1938 amendments indicates that their purpose was to destroy all state
priorities except rent priorities.40 It would contravene this fundamental
34. 44 STAT. 667 (1926). It might be argued that if the Act preserved state liens
and then purported to define the contents of an acceptable state lien law, it would be
unconstitutional under the rule of Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dis-
trict No. 1, 298 U. S. 513 (1936). In that case the Federal Government was forbidden
to induce the states to give up their powers by submission or consent. This rule, how-
ever, was apparently rejected in United States v. Bekins, 304 U. S. 27 (193S).
35. Longstreth v. Pennock, 20 Wall. 575 (U. S. 1874); In re Caplan, 23 F. (2d)
680 (D. Md. 1927).
36. 304 U. S. 64 (1938) ; see AVest v. Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U. S. 223 (1940);
Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (193S) 47 YAt.L L. J. 1336.
37. In a strict sense, a court alxays applies the law of its own forum, from which
alone it derives the power to decide cases, and its own conception of the meaning of
terms. In the lien problem, federal courts are given jurisdiction by the BanAruptcy Act
and some guidance by §§ 67(b) and (c) of the Act and relevant state statutes, but, be-
yond that, their decisions will necessarily turn on what they personally think a lien is.
Compare Cook, 'Characterization' in the Con flict of Laws (1941) 51 YALu L J. 191,
195 et seq. with Lorenzen, The Qualification, Classification, or Ciaractericalion Prob-
km in the Conflict of Laws (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 743, 749 et seq.
38. See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (Moore's ed. 1941) 2055; In re BIannon, 62 F. (2d)
959 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) ; Hutson v. Long Bell Lumber Co., I F. Supp. 4tS (fV. D. Mu.
1932), aff'd sub nora. Carson v. Long-Bell Lumber Corp., 73 F. (2d) 397 1C. C. A. 8th,
1934), cert. denied, 294 U. S. 707 (1935).
39. 52 STA. 877 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 107(c) (1940).
40. See note 20 supra.
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purpose to raise claims recently deleted from the last priority in Section 64
to an even more favorable status under the lien section.
In solving the lien problems as well as other problems on the border
between the Bankruptcy Act and state law, the courts must balance the
interest in national uniformity of bankruptcy proceedings as recognized in
the Constitution 41 against the interest in uniform law within each of the
states as recognized in the Tompkins case. When it is sought to interpret
a term used in the Bankruptcy Act by a rule of state law, the federal court
should first determine whether the rule governs legal relationships unrelated
to an insolvency situation or whether it deals solely with the distribution of
assets of insolvent estates. If it is purely an insolvency rule, no question of
conforming federal law to that of the states arises; the rule must be discarded
in the face of the supremacy and exclusiveness of the federal bankruptcy
rules. If, on the other hand, it governs legal relationships apart from an
insolvency situation, its legal results should, in the interests of uniformity
of law covering a given situation in a single state, be accepted in bankruptcy
proceedings unless they are clearly contrary to the purpose of the Act.4 2 In
Geist v. Prudence Realization Corporation43 the criterion of whether the
state rule was a matter of general law or of insolvency was applied to deter-
mine its treatment by the federal court. This case arose upon petition by
a bankruptcy trustee for the subordination of a mortgage claim owned by
a mortgage guaranty firm to the claims of customers who had bought share.
in the mortgage from the firm. Finding that the rule of state law under
which the petition was urged was a rule of contract governing the construe-
tion of mortgage guaranty instruments generally and not solely a rule of
distribution of insolvent estates, the court granted the petition.44 If the
approach of the Geist case is to be followed, state statutes which create pri-
orities in insolvency proceedings in favor of wage earners and call them liens
cannot be effectuated in bankruptcy proceedings. If this result is an in-
equitable one, it is the fault not of the courts but of Congress.
41. U. S. CoNsT., Art. I, § 7(4).
42. Contrast with this test the rule applied to national bank liquidations in Bryant
v. Linn County, 27 F. Supp. 562 (D. Ore. 1938). It was there held that whether a trutst
was created under Oregon law upon certain funds in the possession of a national batik
depended on whether the bank was solvent or insolvent. If the bank were solvent, state
law would apply. If it were insolvent, federal law would control. Under this rule, log-
ically carried out, a defense to a note which is sufficient one day might be insufficient the
next day, valid if the note were in the hands of one person and invalid if it were in the
hands of another. This is the situation the Tompkins case sought to prevent.
43. 122 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. granted, 10 U. S. L. W mc 3205
(U. S. 1942), -(1941) 51 YALE L. J. 315; cf. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Forty-One
Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U. S. 120 (1937).
44. For situations in which the state law would be enforced under this rule see
In re Mt. Forest Fur Farms of America, 122 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941); Tower
Grove Bank & Trust Co. v. Weinstein, 119 F. (2d) 120 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941); Cannon
v. Dixon, 115 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940); In re Wiegand, 27 F. Supp. 725 (S,
D. Cal., 1939). See also Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188 (1938).
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APPLICATION OF VENUE PROVISIONS OF THE JONES ACT
IN ADMIRALTY PROCEEDINGS*
PRIOR to the adoption of Section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920,'
commonly known as the Jones Act,.a mariner who fell ill or was injured in
the course of his employment had resort in admiralty to an in rem action
for wages to the end of the voyage, and for maintenance and cure there-
after.2  To obtain indemnity, however, he had to prove that unseaworthiness
of the vessel or defective equipment was the proximate cause of his injury.
In the action for indemnity all affirmative defenses including assumption of
risk, negligence of a fellow servant and contributory negligence were avail-
able to the employer.3
Because of the inadequacy of these remedies. Congress in the Jones Act
extended to injured seamen all the rights and remedies which had previously
been given to railway employees under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act:4 the cause of action for indemnity is based upon negligence, but the
affirmative defenses of the employer are largely abolished. The courts, in
order to avoid the issue of constitutionality,5 held that the rights of the
Jones Act were available in admiralty as well as at law. Similar judicial
interpretation led to the holding that the state and federal courts had con-
current jurisdiction to enforce the Act.
The ambiguous language0 of the Jones Act, however, has left to the
courts the task of giving meaning to its venue provisions. The statute
specifies :7
"Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of
his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for danmages
at law, with the right of trial by jury and in such action all statutes
of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right
or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall
apply . . . Jurisdictions in such actions shall be under the court
*Brown v. C. D. Mallory & Co., 122 F. (2d) 98 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
1. 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1940).
2. See Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U. S. 525 (1938).
3. The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158 (1903).
4. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. §51 (1940).
5. See Panama R. P. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375 (192-3). In tiat cawe defendants
objected that the statute was in conflict with L. S. CousT., Art. III, §2 which extends
the judicial power of the United States to "all cases of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction". The statute was held not to be construed as restricting enforcement of the
new rights to actions at law, which might mean an unconstitutional encroaclunent on
maritime jurisdiction, or a withdrawval of subject matter from reach of maritime law.
6. See Arthur v. Compagnie Gen. Trans., 72 F. (2d) 662 (C. C. A. Sth, 1934);
Stewart v. Pacific Steam Nay. Co., 3 F. (2d) 329 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
7. 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1940) (italics supplied).
S. The word "jurisdiction" as used in the statute is construed as a venue limitation.
Panama R. R. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 383 (1923). This construction ignores the
careful distinction made by federal courts between jurisdiction, which relates to the
inherent powers of a court, and venue, which as a personal privilege can be waived
by the parties. In the Panama Railroad case, supra, the court further decided that a
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of the district in *which the defendant cmployer resides or in which
his principal office is located."
Clearly, under the wording of the statute, no action on the law side of
the federal district court may be entertained unless brought in the district
of residence or principal business office'of the employer. However, by ex-
tending the rights provided by the Jones Act to actions in admiralty, the
courts introduced the vexatious question of whether the venue restrictions
apply to actions in admiralty as well. Traditionally, jurisdiction in admiralty
proceedings for indemnity has been obtained by personal service, or by a
foreign attachment of the defendant's property;9 the latter process initiated
an in personam action against a non-resident defendant who could not be
found in the district.
In a recent action brought in a District Court of Pennsylvania against
a Delaware corporation with no business office in Pennsylvania, jurisdiction
of an in personam action for damages under the Jones Act was obtained
by a foreign attachment of the Steamship "Swiftarrow". The Circuit Court
of Appeals, reversing an en banc decision of the lower court,10 held a
personal action in admiralty under the Jones Act to be properly before the
court once it satisfies the established admiralty rules of venue. In this way, the
venue provision of the Jones Act was restricted to actions at law."1 Although
general appearance waived the requirement that the action be brought in the district
of the defendant's residence or principal office. Also, failure to comply with venue
provisions was held not to preclude a suit under the Jones Act in state courts. Such
actions would lie even when removed to a federal court which had no original venue.
See Bainbridge v. Merchants' & Miners' Transp. Co., 287 U. S. 278 (1932) ; cl. Caceres
v. Emergency Fleet Corp., 299 Fed. 968 (E. D. N. Y. 1924); Atianza v. Emergency
Fleet Corp., 299 Fed. 975 (E. D. N. Y. 1924). Nor does the Jones Act prevent a
seaman from bringing suit against a foreign corporation in federal court. Stewart v,
Pacific Steam Nay. Co., 3 F. (2d) 329 (S. D. N. Y. 1924); cf. Leffellad v. Detroit
& Clev. Nay. Co., 16 F. (2d) 1011 (W. D. N. Y. 1926).
9. Workman v. New York City, 179 U. S. 552 (1900); Atkins v. The Fiber
Disintegrating Co., 18 Wall. 272 (U. S. 1873).
10. Brown v. C. D. Mallory & Co., 34 F. Supp. 541 (E. D. Pa. 1940), 89 U. ov
PA. L. REv. 235.
11. Because of the settled rule that an action under the Jones Act may not be
brought in admiralty in a libel action against the ship, Plamals v. S. S. Pinar Del Rio,
277 U. S. 151 (1928), the court first determined that the action initiated by tie foreign
attachment was not in rem. The mere seizure of property at the inception of the action
does not convert the personal action into an in rem action. But cf. The Pomona, 1938
Am. Mar. Cas. 1357 (S. D. Cal. 1938). Like the quasi-ini-rem action at law, the
admiralty action runs against the person and not the thing seized. In admiralty a
district court has regularly been able to obtain jurisdiction to proceed in persoalmn
against a non-resident by attachment of his property within the district regardless of
the character of the property. The local admiralty rule of the Third Circuit, for
example, provides that proceedings under foreign attachment "shall be regulated as
proceedings in personam." Local Admiralty Rule 8 (C. C. A. 3d). This action
differs from the regular admiralty libel action, in which a more restrictive lien is placed
upon a vessel owned by the defendant. In the personal action, the lien is merely aimed
at retaining possession of the attached property, and if, for example, an acceptable bond
[Vol. 51
VOTES
the decisions are conflicting, the majority of cases seem to support this
complete disregard of the Jones Act venue provision in admiralty actions.' 2
The leading case of Panama Railroad Company v. Johnson," in which the
Supreme Court held the Act generally applicable to admiralty as well as
law actions, has often been advanced to support both views and offers little
towards solution of the immediate issue.
The major argument behind the contention that the venue provision of the
Jones Act does not apply in admiralty is that the statute merely adds to the
substantive rights of seamen to obtain indemnity in admiralty, but does not
affect those rights which previously existed. The Jones Act is said not to
create a new right of action, but only to furnish cumulative rights going to
the old cause of action.14 However, this argument is not persuasive since
the venue provisions of the Jones Act control in law actions,'0 even though
a similar situation there exists.
Those seeking to apply the enlarged concept of venue in admiralty also
maintain that the venue limitation is not a condition precedent to the invo-
cation of the substantive provisions of the Act, since the statute mentions
only actions at law. The libel under which the admiralty court obtains juris-
diction, and, it is claimed, venue, is filed under the general admiralty prac-
is substituted for the property, the lien disintegrates. A maritime lien, on the other
hand, is impressed when the cause of action accrues and remains, no matter where the
res may be taken, until satisfied. It is a secret lien with qualities of paramontcy which
may be asserted to the prejudice of general creditors and subsequent purchasers without
notice, giving to the libelant a proprietary interest in the ship and a right to proceed
against it to protect that interest. Because of the fundamental differences between the
two actions, the rule prohibiting an in rem action under the Jones Act cannot regulate
an in personam action which is instituted through foreign attachment. It seems the
only valid argument against venue that can be advanced is that by indirection one
should not be able to accomplish what cannot be done directly.
12. Until the lower court decision in this case, courts within the Third Circuit
had consistently upheld actions in admiralty based on foreign attachment of property
belonging to foreign corporations. Carr v. Union Sulphur Co., 1937 Am. 'aar. Cas. 227
(E. D. Pa. 1936); Eckert v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 13 F. Supp. 342 (E. D.
Pa. 1935). In other jurisdictions see Arthur v. Compagnie Gen. Trans., 72 F.
(2d) 662 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); MeKola v. 'McCormick S. S. Co., 24 F. Supp. 378
(N. D. Cal. 1938); Bemett v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 33 F. Supp. 871 (D. Md.
1940). Contra: Bannon v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 52 F. (2d) 8S6 (S. D. Ga. 1930);
Stein v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 36 F. (2d) 258 (S. D. N. Y. 1929) (no valid process
served); The Pomona, 1938 Am. Mar. Cas. 1357 (S. D. Calif. 1938). The latter
decision was the only one that considered the possibility that different treatment might
be accorded to admiralty cases. The decision itself turned directly on the holding that
a personal action based on foreign attachment was an in rem proceeding in which the
Jones Act could not be invoked.
13. 264 U. S. 375 (1923).
14. See Eckert v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 13 F. Supp. 342 (E. D. Pa. 1935).
15. Summerall v. United Fruit Co., 11 F. Supp. 963 (S. D. N. Y. 1935), aff'd,
80 F. (2d) 1020 (1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 658 (1936) ; Peters v. Detroit & Clev.
Nav. Co., 24 F. (2d) 454 (f. D. N. Y. 1927); Leon v. Emergency Fleet Corp., 28
Fed. 681 (S. D. N. Y. 1921).
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tice. The Act thus does not control the place where the libel is filed.
Support of this artificial separation of substantive and procedural rights is
found in the practice of allowing actions under the Jones Act in state courts,
10
despite the fact that the venue provisions are there held inapplicable. The
same separation is also found in suits brought in federal courts against alien
corporations with principal places of business in foreign countries.1 7 Under
these analogies, the substantice advantages of the Jones Act might be in-
voked in any proceeding, including admiralty, which was formerly available
in the state or federal courts, except in actions at law which are specifically
restricted by the statute.
In direct contrast, it has been asserted that the provisions of the Jones
Act, if carried over into admiralty by judicial interpretation, do not affect
any of the rights formerly available, but rather give to the injured seaman
new rights conditioned by limited venue. The majority view that the rights
under the Jones Act are engrafted upon the existing attributes of admiralty
proceedings is here directly refuted by the established rule that rights under
the Jones Act cannot be asserted through in rem actions in admiralty.18
Moreover, although there is no statute of limitations in personal injury cases
on the admiralty side, a three-year statute of limitations written into the
Jones Act has been held to control both suits in admiralty and at law. 10 By
analogy, it is urged that if relief afforded by the Jones Act is to be obtained
in admiralty, its venue provision should apply.
A far more tenable argument in support of restricted admiralty venue can
be found in a strict construction of the statute. Mr. Justice McReynolds
in the Panama Railroad case construed the phrase, "in such actions", to
include suits in admiralty as well as at law.20 Since the phrase appears three
times in the statute, it is reasonable to infer that its meaning is constant.
Therefore, to be consistent, the venue provision, which is qualified by the
phrase "in such actions", should be held a fortiori to include actions both
at law and in admiralty. A strict construction of the statute would seem
to settle the problem, if it were not for the fact that the foundation of this
interpretation is the improbable meaning originally given that phrase in the
Panama Railroad case.
Although Congressional intent is not easily discernible, 21 the venue pro-
visions, which govern only access to the courts, should be interpreted favor-
ably for the seamen.2 2 This is especially true because many of the sub-
16. Bambridge v. Merchants' & Miners' Transp. Co., 287 U. S. 278 (1932),
17. Stewart v. Pacific Steam Nay. Co., 3 F. (2d) 329 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
18. Plamals v. S. S. Pinar Del Rio, 277 U. S. 151 (1928).
19. Kirby v. South At. S. S. Co., 25 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1938).
20. Panama R. R. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 391 (1923). The majority opinion
in Brown v. C. D. Mallory & Co., 122 F. (2d) 98 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), arbitrarily gave
to the phrase "in such actions" in the second sentence of the Jones Act the meaning
of "actions for damages at law".
21. The language of the reports, from which the intention of Congress may be
gleaned, "is really no broader than that of the statute." See majority opinion in Brown
v. C. D. Mallory & Co., 122 F. (2d) 98, 102, n. 8 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
22. The Seamen's Act, which was amended and supplemented by the Jones Act,
was directed to the promotion of the welfare of American seamen in accordance with
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stantive rights which are accorded the injured mariner under the Jones Act
would be denied him if the venue provision of the Act were literally applied
in admiralty actions. Although Congress has stated an intention to divest
the employer of substantially all of his affirmative defenses, the injured
seaman who is not present in the district in which the defendant is incor-
porated, or in which its principal office is situated, would frequently be
compelled to contest those very defenses. Most shipping companies have
their main offices in New York and are incorporated in a few favored states.
Unless the foreign attachment is permitted in admiralty actions, an injured
seaman may be forced to travel great distances2 with his witnesses in order
to bring a negligence action under the Jones Act against his employer.
Furthermore, if there is more than one defendant in the action,2 4 each with
a different business office, the seaman would be compelled to bring separate
actions, although under foreign attachment he could bring actions against
all at the same time. It is true that if venue does not permit an action under
the Jones Act in admiralty, such an action may be brought by foreign
attachment in the state courts. However, the alternative of state court pro-
ceedings with a jury trial does not compensate the seaman for the loss of
the additional advantages he may enjoy by bringing his suit on the admiralty
side of the federal court. Moreover, in territories where the federal courts
possess the unlimited civil jurisdiction given to the state courts, even that
inferior substitute is not available.
Unlike injured railroad employees who can bring their actions in certain
favored jurisdictions,2 5 seamen can libel the defendant's vessels by foreigi
attachment only in those states in which the vessels dock.20 Thus, the
possible resultant disadvantage to the defendant employer in being subjected
to actions founded on foreign attachment is slight. In fact, he may benefit
by the opportunity to present his witnesses and defenses with the least cost
to himself.
Abuse of the foreign attachment process can be prevented without complete
prohibition of actions. Admiralty courts have already denied themselves
jurisdiction in actions either lacking in good faith2 7 or not based upon the
the general policy of treating them as a favored class. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165
U. S. 275 (1897) ; Grant v. Emergency Fleet Corp., 24 F. (2d) 812 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
23. See Arthur v. Compagnie Gen. Trans., 72 F. (2d) 662 (C. CA. Sth, 1934).
24. See McKola v. McCormick S. S. Co., 24 F. Supp. 378 (N. D. Cal. 1938).
25. Venue under the Federal Employers' Liability Act is permitted not only at the
residence and the principal place of business of the defendant, but also in the state
where the cause of action arose. 35 STAT. 66 (1908), 45 U. S. C. § 56 (1940). By
analogy, seamen should at least be allowed to bring action at the first port reached
after the injury.
26. Other property might well be attached in states not fringed by water, but
rarely would seamen be willing to travel inland to bring an action in those few states
in which shipping firms may possess property. Ifore important, admiralty actions are
not jury trials and thus many of the especial incentives for bringing actions in certain
jurisdictions are not present.
27. Neptune Steam Nay. Co. v. Sullivan Timber Co., 37 Fed. 159 (S. D. N. Y.
1888).
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needs of justice.28 Such voluntary restrictions imposed at the discretion of
the courts 29 may be applied to actions under the Jones Act so as to preclude
any action which would place the employer at an unfair disadvantage. 'Under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens,30 a court, having statutory juris-
diction, may withhold its facilities from a suit that in the interests of justice
and convenience should be tried elsewhere. These are safeguards which
should prevent liberal construction of the venue provision of the Act from
leading to excessively burdensome litigation.
In many instances, the problem of proper venue may be avoided by a
constructive waiver of the personal privilege -of venue.31 Under the recent
decision in Neirbo Company v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation," a
foreign corporation has been held to waive its venue privileges by appoint-
ment of an agent within the state to receive service of process. Thus, if a
corporation appoints an agent to receive process within the state, an injured
seaman can bring an action in admiralty under the Jones Act based on
personal service or foreign attachment even though brought in a district
which does not come within the venue provisions of the Jones Act. If the
rule in the Neirbo case is applied to all corporations which are subject to
service 'of process through a' statutory agent,33 waiver may be claimed in the
forty-seven states 34 which provide for the appointment of some form of
service agent for foreign corporations. However, only causes of action aris-
ing within the state may be brought into court by service upon a statutory
agent, unless a corporation has expressly appointed the agent, or unless
the statute gives larger scope to the appointment. 3 Thus it may be impossible
to argue waiver of venue if the action is brought under the Jones Act for
an injury sustained outside the territorial jurisdiction of the state. Waiver
of venue has also been broadened in several cases 3G to include alien cor-
28. Cavanaugh v. Starbuck Tow. Corp., 261 Fed. 656 (E. D. N. Y. 1919) (no
evidence of want of good faith).
29. See Coffey, Jurisdiction over Foreigners in Admiralty Courts (1925) 13 CALIF.
L. REV. 93, 94.
30. Compare Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Xepner, 314 U. S. 44 (1941) (see
also dissent) ; see Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions (1930) 43 HAMy. L. RE V. 1217;
Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 1. Although
the latter author applies the doctrine in admiralty as well as in law actions, there are
no admiralty cases cited.
31. See Panama R. R. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375 (1923).
32. 308 U. S. 165 (1939).
33. For other problems and ramifications of waiver of venue see Note (1940)
49 YALE L. J. 724.
34. See PARKERS' CORPORATION MANUAL (41st ed. 1940) 3, 49, 52.
35. Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U. S. 115 (1915); Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n
v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8 (1907). Service under such a statute may be valid as to
foreign causes of action if, the statute either expressly or by construction has that
scope. Cohen v. American Window Glass Co., U. S. Second Cir. Ct, of Appeals,
Feb. 26, 1942; see Davis v. Farmers' Cooperative Co., 262 U. S. 312, 315 (1923);
Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Brick Co., 257 U. S. 213, 216 (1921).
36. Leffellad v. Detroit & Clev. Nay. Co., 16 F. (2d) 1011 (W. D. N. Y. 1926);
Stewart v. Pacific Steam Nay. Co., 3 F. (2d) 329 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
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porations which maintain branch offices within the district. In the principal
case, before waiver of the venue provision could have been constructed on
the basis of the Pennsylvania statute which allows service on any agent of
a foreign corporation doing business within the state, it would have been
necessary to show that the defendant was engaged in business within the
state.3
7
Despite the added possibility of waiver of venue by foreign corporations,
it would seem that if seamen are to receive the full benefit of the advantages
given them by the Jones Act, the federal courts should not apply in admiralty
the limited venue provision controlling legal actions. For that reason, the
decision in the principal case is the most reasonable and desirable position.
More satisfactory, however, would be a general revision by Congress of the
defective wording of the present venue section of the Act.
INCOME TAX CREDIT FOR FOREIGN TAXES PAID BY FOREIGN
SUBSIDIARIES OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS*
IMPELLED by an increasing need for federal revenue, the Treasury Depart-
ment has, wherever possible, promulgated new regulations designed to raise
additional taxes. A convenient procedure frequently adopted is to reinterpret
existing revenue statutes, particularly those containing ambiguous language
previously construed in favor of the taxpayer. But this process inevitably
encounters judicial reluctance to reverse statutory interpretations which have
been followed for a substantial number of years.
Both the reinterpretative process and its attendant problems are illustrated
by the history of the income tax credit allowed to American corporations
for taxes paid to foreign governments by their foreign subsidiaries on income
from which the parent ultimately draws dividends.' For purposes of com-
37. Because the ships of the defendant in Brown v. C. D. Mallory & Co., 122 F.
(2d) 98 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), had no regular schedule in Pennsylvania, there was no
serious attempt made to urge the waiver theory upon the court. If the defendant could
have been shown to have conducted business in the state, the Neirbo decision would
probably have controlled. Such a foreign corporation can be compelled to submit to
service of process, even if engaged in interstate commerce, International Harvester Co.
v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914), and service upon any agent would have been suffi-
cient under the Pennsylvania statute, PA. ST.. A-,. (Purdksn, 1938) tit. 15 §3142,
to constitute a waiver of venue, even in admiralty.
-Aluminum Co. of America v. United States. 123 F. (2d) 615 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941);
American Chicle Co. v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 537 (Ct. Cl. 1941), cert. granted,
10 U. S. L. WEEn 3271 (U. S. 1942).
1. For a general discussion of problems concerning extraterritorial taxation see
Wurzel, Foreign Investment and Extraterritorial Taxation (1938) 38 CoL. L Rs '. 809.
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puting this credit, Section 131 (f) of the Internal Revenue Code provides
that domestic corporations "shall be deemed to have paid the same propor-
tion" of any foreign taxes incurred by the subsidiary "upon or with respect
to [its] accumulated profits . . . from which such dividends were paid,
which the amount of such dividends bears to the amount of such accumu-
lated profits." "Accumulated profits" is defined as profits in excess of taxes
imposed thereon.2
Designed to avoid double taxation,3 this statutory provision has remained
unchanged since its adoption in 1921. Its interpretation, however, has been
highly controversial. From 1921 to 1931 the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue determined the amount of allowable credit by multiplying the pri-
mary ratio, "dividends-received-by-the-parent to the subsidiary's-accumnlated-
profits", by the "total foreign tax accrued or paid". 4 Thus, if a wholly owned
subsidiary earned $100,000 in a given year and paid $20,000 in foreign taxes,
its accumulated profits, as defined by the statute, would be $80,000. If all
the accumulated profits were paid as dividends to the parent corporation,
clearly the credit allowable under the formula would be $20,000 or the total
foreign tax. The grammatical effect of the Treasury interpretation was to
change the statute's multiplicand "taxes on accumulated profits" into "taxes
on total profits". 5 Its practical effect was to allow a corre.spondingly larger
credit.
The Commission adopted a new formula in 1931. The statutory ratio was
of course retained. In place of the former multiplicand, however, there was
substituted "total foreign tax paid" times the ratio of the subsidiary's ac-
cumulated profits to its "total profits".0 Since the effect of the change was
to limit the allowable credit to taxes actually paid on accumulated profits,
taxpaying domestic corporations have repeatedly resisted its application.
Their position was early upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Second
2. 53 STAT. 56 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 131(f) (1940).
3. See Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U. S. 1, 7 (1932).
4. U. S. TREAs. REG. 74, Art. 698 (1928). The resulting formula is illistrated by
the following equation:
Dividends received
X Foreign tax accrued or paid = Credit
Accumulated profits of
subsidiary
5. American Chicle Co. v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 537, 542 (Ct. C, 1941).
6. U. S. TRF-AS. REG.. 77, Art. 697 (1932) (adopting a "new" form 1118 issued by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in 1931). The regulation in effect at present is
substantially the same. U. S. TRFAS. REG. 103, § 19.131-7 (1940). The resultant equa-
tion is:
Accumulated profits Taxes deemed
Dividends received Foreign tax of subsidiary to have beenX - X -paid on
Accumulated profits accrued or pai( Total profits of profits dis-
of subsidiary subsidiary ividends
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Circuit 7 and by the Court of Claims.8 Despite the Supreme Court's growing
tendency to decide tax problems in favor of the Government, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals recently added its disapproval of the Government's
formula in Alumhinum Company of America v. United States.0
In the Aluminum Company case, the Government contended that the 1931
Treasury ruling was a reinterpretation of the 1921 statutory provision and
applied to all cases arising since 1921. In addition it was contended that
reenactment of the section in 1932 implied Congressional approval of the
amended regulation. But since the case actually involved the 1926 Act and
the new formula was not expressly retroactive, the taxpayer was able to
rebut this argument. Furthermore, affirmatively supporting the taxpayer's
position was the ten-year use of the earlier formula through two legislative
reenactments and without any administrative attempts at revision though
the practical effects were immediately apparent."' From the orthodox sources
of original legislative intent, the taxpayer was able to strengthen his argu-
ment. The present statutory provision was first adopted in 1921 when "ac-
cumulated profits" was substituted for the former term "total taxable income"
as the denominator of the principal fraction. At the time of its consideration
by the Senate, an example of its application was presented which clearly
conforms to the interpretation now urged by the taxpayer. 1
But the administrative arguments advanced by the taxpayer have slight
persuasive force since both formulas have existed in years when Congress
has reenacted the statute without alteration. Nor are the manifestations of
Congressional intent uniformly in favor of the taxpayer. Against the prac-
tical example reported to the Senate, there must be weighed the stated pur-
7. F. W. Woolworth & Co. v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937),
cert. denied, 302 U. S. 76S (1938).
S. International Milling Co. v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 592 (Ct. Cl. 1939).
9. 123 F. (2d) 615 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941). The Aluminum Co. of America, a
Pennsylvania corporation, owned all the voting stock of iLs Canadian subsidiary. In
1927 the subsidiary had total profits of $2,879,101, upon which it paid Canadian incrome
and profits taxes in an aggregate amount of $214,168, leaving accumulated profits of
$2,664,993 as defined by the Revenue Act of 1926. In the same year, the parent cor-
poration received from the Canadian subsidiary dividends totaling $1,0!0,000 paid from
these accumulated profits. In computing its domestic income tax, the Aluminum Co.
of America claimed a credit of $80,365 due to the foreign income taxes paid by the
subsidiary. The Commissioner, however, allowed a credit of only $74,357. The tax
was paid and suit was brought for refund of the disalluwed portion of the credit.
10. For the proposition that contemporaneous administrative interpretation, %,hich
is maintained for a substantial period, is indicative of legislative intent even though the
interpretation is not to be deemed incorporated thereby into the statute upon reenact-
ment see Griswold, A Summary of the Regidations Problem (1941) 54 HAr'. L REV.
398, 405.
11. "Assume that the foreign corporation accumulated a surplus of $200,000 upon
which it has paid income and profits taxes of $S0,000, leaving $120,000 of disposable or
distributable surplus. Assume further that it actually pays dividends to the American
parent company of $50,000, i.e., of Z i of its disposable surplus. Then the American
parent company may take credit for -L of the -80,000 taxes which the foreign subsidiary
paid, i.e., it may take credit for $33,333.33." 61 CONG. R c. 7184 (1921).
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pose of the revisers to "protect the American tax" by restricting the credit
allowed.' 2
There are additional objections which have been successfully urged against
the Government. When compared with the words of the statute, the 1931
interpretation has been held deficient for its failure to give any effect to
the phrase "or with respect to". Since the words are present in the statute,
it is argued, they are necessarily there for some purpose, and that purpose
is clearly to create an alternative to the restrictive "upon". Since the alter-
native "with respect to" (which is descriptive rather than restrictive) is
available, it allegedly is intended to include taxes on accumulated profits
and also taxes imposed on the total profits which included the accumulated
profits.13 This rationalization, however, and the formula it purports to defend
are open to the very objection which they themselves raise. For after postu-
lating a choice of terms, they virtually eliminate the alternative "upon" and
give effect only to ."with respect to". In the face of statutory ambiguity,
therefore, neither formula is necessarily the accurate one.
The chief pitfall confronting the Government lies in its treatment of the
term "accumulated profits". Since this term is prescribed as the denominator
of the principal fraction, it is incorporated by both conflicting formulas.
In the case of the Government, however, it is incorporated not once but
twice. Since it appears first in the denominator and then in the numerator,
the practical effect of the double use is to cancel out "accumulated profits".
The result, it is alleged, is in effect an assertion that Congress meant nothing
in 1921 by substituting and simultaneously defining the term.14
The Government's answer to this argument is that its equation is dictated
by the requirement of the statute that the foreign tax must be prorated
to reflect the portion thereof attributable to accumulated profits (which are
defined as total profits less tax thereon). 1 , Furthermore, the taxpayer's
formula itself flagrantly fails to give effect to the 1921 change, for it con-
strues the statutory multiplicand to mean "taxes paid upon total profits upon
or with respect to which such taxes were paid by the foreign corporation."
This is equivalent to the language of the 1918 Act which the existing pro-
vision was designed to revise and restrict.
Although the Government's arguments had been consistently unsuccessful,
they were not abandoned; three days after the defeat in the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, the theory of the Revenue Bureau at last prevailed.
Reversing its former position, the Court of Claims held that the Govern-
ment's formula more precisely fits the language of Section 131(f). 10 Since
the case involved taxes levied under the 1932 Act, the administrative history
was found to be inconclusive; and the direct statement of legislative purpose
12. 61 CONG. REc. 7184 (1921).
13. International Milling Co. v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 592, 597 (Ct. Cl. 1939).
14. International Milling Co. v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 592, 596 (Ct. Cl. 1939) ;
Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 123 F. (2d) 615, 618 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
15. Brief for the United States, p. 35, American Chicle Co. v. United States, 41 F.
Supp. 537 (Ct. Cl. 1941).
16. American Chicle Co. v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 537 (Ct. Cl. 1941).
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in 192137 was held to be more indicative of intent than the example given
at that time.
Chief affirmative justification for the decision, however, stemmed from
broader considerations-principally the disparity in an American tax depend-
ent on whether a domestic corporation's foreign operations are being con-
ducted through a brand or through a wholly-owned subsidiary.18 If a situation
be assumed of a foreign branch and a foreign subsidiary with identical total
taxable incomes, application of the taxpayer's formula would make the
parent's American tax disproportionately greater in the case of branch owner-
ship.19 While some discrepancy remains when the Government's formula
is utilized, the net effect in the latter instance is substantial equalization of
treatment. The Court of Claims refused to impute to Congress an intent to
introduce a discrimination which the 1918 statute before amendment did
not sanction.20 In the absence of a showing that non-discrimination would
discourage the development of foreign commerce,- ' the conclusion of the
court is patently justified.
If it could be said that the Government's restrictive formula subjects the
taxpayer to double taxation, there would be reason for a contrary decision.
In one sense, of course, double taxation of the same profits results to the
extent that the credit fails to equal the taxes paid by the subsidiary. This
burden, however, is one contemplated by the statute, and the same thing
is true, to a lesser extent, of the taxpayer formula. Although the purpose
of the credit provision has been held to be avoidance of double taxation, -2
consideration of the subsidiary relationship makes the issue of dubious
relevance. The concept of double taxation contemplates taxation of the
17. 61 CONG. Rzc. 7184 (1921). The statements, however, are somewhat incon-
clusive for by a judicious extraction of apposite sentences it seems possible to support
either contention.
18. For purposes of illustrative clarity, the subsidiary is here considered as totally
owned by the parent corporation. But the same principles are pertinent where there is
partial ownership.
19. For example, assume that the foreign representative has a profit of $100,000 dur-
ing the taxable year, the foreign tax is $20,000 and the American tax is to be 25 per cent
of the American income. Under branch operation, since the entire $100,000 is returnable
as American income subject to tax, the net American tax vill be $5,000 (,25,000 less
$20,000 credit). In the subsidiary relationship, however, there will be no American tax
payable if the taxpayer's formula is used, for the $20,000 tax upon the $90,000 income is
counterbalanced by a $20,000 credit; but under the Government's formula the tax pay-
able will be $4,000 (the credit being four-fifths of $20,000 or $16,000).
20. American Chicle Co. v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 537, 543 (Ct. Cl. 1941).
21. The policy underlying this credit is to encourage the expansion of foreign coin-
merce. See ,Vurtzel, Foreig Investment and Exlraterritorial Taxation (193S) 33 COL
L. REv. 809, 850. It seems improbable, however, that the instant restrictive formula
would deter a continuance of this type of commerce or even of any increased develop-
ment in it. But see Carroll, Rcmoz'al of Tax Barriers to American Foreigns Trade (1940)
18 TAxEs 616.
22. Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U. S. 1, 7 (1932).
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same income in both the foreign country and the United States ;23 it is based
on a theory of direct liability and direct payment, not of ultimate burden or
final incidence.24 In the situation embraced by Section 131(f), it is neither
unfair nor unrealistic to distinguish between foreign taxes paid by the
foreign subsidiary on its profits and domestic taxes paid by the domestic
parent on income determined by dividends from the former. The taxpayer
formula, on the other hand, would have the unrealistic result of allowing,
in the name of a ban against double taxation, deduction in toto of foreign
taxes paid upon foreign income which never became American income."
23. See Hubbard v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 93 (Ct. Cl. 1936), cerl. denied, 300
U. S. 666 (1937).
24. See Biddle v. Commissioner, 86 F. (2d) 718, 720, 721 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
25. American Chicle Co. v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 537 (Ct. Cl. 1941).
